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Standing to Appeal and Executive Non-Defense
of Federal Law After the Marriage Cases
RYAN W. SCOTT*
INTRODUCTION
For supporters and opponents of same-sex marriage, the Supreme Court’s samesex marriage cases, United States v. Windsor1 and Hollingsworth v. Perry,2 must
have felt anticlimactic. In December 2012, when the Court agreed to consider equal
protection challenges to federal and state laws that deny recognition to same-sex
marriages,3 the cases were heralded as blockbusters that would place the Supreme
Court “at the center of the nation’s debate over whether gay couples have the same
fundamental right to marry as heterosexuals.”4 Advocates on both sides cheered the
Court’s decision and predicted a “sweeping” victory on the merits.5
Perhaps we should rename them the “appellate standing cases.” From the outset,
the Court signaled that, in addition to the merits, it would also address the kind of
dry, procedural questions that put activists and journalists to sleep: whether the
petitioners in each case had Article III standing to bring an appeal.6 That threshold
question arose in both cases because executive officials chose to enforce laws
against same-sex marriage but not to defend them against constitutional attack. At
oral arguments in March 2013, the Court disappointed many observers by
dedicating more than one third of its time to questions about standing and
jurisdiction.7 By the time the Court announced its decisions in June 2013, standing
had taken center stage. In Perry, the Court by a 5–4 margin dismissed the appeal

* Associate Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Bloomington.
1. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
2. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
3. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786, 786 (2012); United States v. Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 786, 787 (2012); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at i, Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307).
4. Robert Barnes, Court Accepts Gay Marriage Cases, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2012, at
A01 (noting that the cases raised the “possibility of a groundbreaking constitutional
decision” or “narrower rulings on a subject that continues to divide the American public”).
5. See Rebekah Metzler, Supporters, Opponents Cheer Supreme Court Decision to Hear
Gay Marriage Cases, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.usnews.com
/news/articles/2012/12/07/supporters-opponents-cheer-supreme-court-decision-to-hear-gay
-marriage-cases.
6. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 786 (directing briefing on the petitioners’ standing to appeal
under Article III); Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 787 (same).
7. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)
(No. 12-144) [hereinafter Perry Arg. Tr.] (approximately 25% of argument time dedicated to
jurisdiction); Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
(No. 12-307) [hereinafter Windsor Arg. Tr.] (approximately 45% of argument time dedicated
to jurisdiction); Judge Not?, ECONOMIST DEMOCRACY AM. BLOG (Mar. 27, 2013, 2:34 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/03/gay-marriage-and-supreme
-court (“Some of the crowd who queued for five days to witness the hearing must have been
disappointed by the focus on process.”).
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entirely, holding that the private citizens who served as official sponsors of
Proposition 8, the ballot initiative that banned same-sex marriage in California,
lacked standing to appeal.8 In Windsor, the Court reached the merits, issuing a
fairly narrow, federalism-infused ruling invalidating section 3 of the Federal
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).9 But first, the Justices dedicated more than a
dozen pages of discussion to jurisdictional questions, concluding by a 6–3 margin
that jurisdiction was proper when the Executive Branch sought to appeal despite
agreeing with the judgment of the lower courts on every issue.10 Whatever their
legacy as civil rights decisions, the marriage cases are blockbusters in the
underdeveloped field of appellate standing.
This Essay offers a mostly critical assessment of the Court’s reasoning on the
standing questions in both Perry and Windsor. Yet it also considers the
implications of the decisions for executive “non-defense” of federal law—the
controversial power of the Executive to enforce a law while refusing to defend it in
court against a constitutional challenge—and finds reasons for cautious optimism.
The Essay advances two basic claims, one descriptive and one normative.
First, the marriage cases significantly reshaped the law of Article III standing to
appeal, notwithstanding the Court’s efforts to ground its decisions in prior
precedent. In Windsor, the Court broke sharply with previous decisions by
recharacterizing “adverseness,” the principle that the parties to a case or
controversy must have opposing interests, as a mere prudential concern rather than
a constitutional requirement. In Perry, the Court announced new and fairly strict
requirements for laws that purport to assign responsibility for defending state laws
to anyone other than executive officials. Those deviations from the Court’s
precedent ought to fuel speculation that the Justices were anxious to avoid a
sweeping constitutional ruling on same-sex marriage, and that they used standing to
accomplish this goal.
Second, despite its novelty, the appellate standing regime inaugurated in the
marriage cases should, on balance, benefit all three branches of government in
constitutional litigation. The Court’s decision in Windsor preserved the executive
power to enforce but not defend laws that the Executive deems unconstitutional.
That power, if used sparingly, can accord greater respect to Congress than
unilateral non-enforcement and thereby avoid unnecessary interbranch conflict. The
Court also consolidated judicial power in executive non-defense cases by clearing
away jurisdictional hurdles to appellate review. That is a positive development in
light of the important error-correction functions performed by appellate courts.
Justice Scalia was wrong to accuse the Court of a judicial “power grab.” Granting
the parties standing to appeal in a case like Windsor does not expand judicial
power when the district court—which unquestionably has standing—will ensure
that the Judicial Department will have the final word anyway.
To be sure, the Court’s new appellate standing rules also carry serious risks. In
the past, the Executive’s reluctance to enforce but not defend laws may have

8. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2659.
9. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689–96.
10. See id. at 2684–88; id. at 2698–2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2711–14 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that the BLAG had standing to appeal, but the United States did not).
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reflected doubts about the practice’s viability. The Court’s endorsement will dispel
those concerns, making it sorely tempting for future Presidents to refuse to defend
all manner of politically controversial laws. Overuse of the non-defense power
risks weakening the Executive’s credibility and converting the courts into a ready
source of political cover. Nonetheless, at this early stage, there is reason for
cautious optimism about the implications of Windsor and Perry for the separation
of powers.
I. THE MARRIAGE CASES’ NEW RULES FOR ARTICLE III STANDING ON APPEAL
The marriage cases made significant changes to the law of Article III standing
on appeal. Windsor reconceptualized “adverseness” as a matter of prudential
standing, rather than an aspect of the constitutional case-or-controversy
requirement, while Perry announced new Article III limits on laws that assign
responsibility for defending state law to anyone other than executive officials.
Although the Court purported to ground its decisions in precedent, both outcomes
required considerable stretching of previous case law.
A. Adverseness and Prudential Standing in Windsor
In Windsor, the surviving spouse in a same-sex marriage sued the United States,
challenging the constitutionality of section 3 of DOMA and seeking a refund of
$363,053 in estate taxes that she paid following her wife’s death.11 While the case
was pending in federal district court, the Attorney General announced that the
Executive Branch would no longer defend section 3 of DOMA from constitutional
challenge, although it would continue to enforce the statute.12 In fact, the Executive
Branch joined the attack on the statute, filing a downright peculiar “Motion to
Dismiss” in which it urged the court to “not dismiss” the complaint.13 To defend
the statute, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) of the House of
Representatives intervened in the case as an interested party.14 The district court
agreed with the plaintiff and the government, entering a judgment striking down
section 3 of DOMA and ordering the government to refund the plaintiff’s tax
payment.15
Despite obtaining the result it desired in the district court, the United States
appealed to the Second Circuit, which affirmed,16 and sought further review from
the U.S. Supreme Court. Under Article III of the Constitution, a federal court may

11. Id. at 2683 (majority opinion).
12. Id. at 2683–84; see also Letter from Eric H. Holder, Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner,
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage
Act (Feb. 23, 2011), [hereinafter Holder Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr
/2011/February/11-ag-223.html.
13. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2699 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Windsor Arg. Tr., supra note
7, at 49–50. Upon learning of that motion, Justice Kennedy remarked, “That—that would
give you intellectual whiplash.” Windsor Arg. Tr., supra note 7, at 50.
14. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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exercise jurisdiction only over “cases” or “controversies.”17 The Supreme Court has
interpreted this limitation as requiring the plaintiff to have suffered an “injury in
fact,” traceable to the defendant and redressable through a favorable decision.18 In
the district court, the injury was obvious: the plaintiff invoked the court’s
jurisdiction seeking a substantial tax refund.19 But on appeal, it was not clear that
any live “controversy” remained. Although the United States filed the appeal, it
was in essence a “prevailing party” in the district court because, like the plaintiff, it
sought “no redress from the judgment entered against it.”20
By a 5–4 margin, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that the
United States had standing to appeal.21 The Court’s crucial doctrinal maneuver
relied on a longstanding distinction between “Article III standing,” which enforces
the Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirement,22 and “prudential standing,” a
set of judicially self-imposed limits.23 The Court reasoned that the United States
could satisfy Article III’s standing requirements on appeal because the government
was injured by the district court’s order to pay money and that injury could be
redressed on appeal.24 The fact that the government chose not to comply with the
district court’s judgment, despite agreeing with it, apparently was critical, as the
Court maintained that “[i]t would be a different case if the Executive had taken the
further step of paying Windsor the refund to which she was entitled under the
District Court’s ruling.”25
The Court acknowledged that the Executive’s “unusual position”26 created a risk
that instead of a “real, earnest and vital controversy,” the Court would face a
“friendly, non-adversary[] proceeding.”27 But it categorized this risk as irrelevant to
Article III, implicating only prudential concerns.28 The distinction is critical
because prudential standing principles may be outweighed by other considerations
or overridden by Congress, whereas Article III standing is an irreducible limit on
the power of federal courts.29

17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
18. E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
19. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684–85.
20. Id. at 2685.
21. Id. at 2684–88. In a separate dissent, Justice Alito concluded that the United States
lacked standing to appeal, but that BLAG enjoyed standing to appeal on behalf of the House
of Representatives. Id. at 2711–14 (Alito, J., dissenting). Three other Justices disagreed,
concluding that BLAG lacked standing as well. Id. at 2703–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing that the judicial power of the United States
extends only to certain kinds of “Cases” and “Controversies”).
23. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685, 2687.
24. Id. at 2686 (reasoning that the fact that the Executive Branch “may welcome this
order . . . does not eliminate the injury to the national Treasury if payment is made, or to the
taxpayer if it is not”).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2687.
27. Id. (quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
28. Id. at 2687.
29. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1975) (discussing the distinction
between prudential and Article III standing).
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Having framed the question as a balance between competing prudential
concerns, the Court held that exercising jurisdiction was appropriate based on two
factors. First, BLAG’s participation as amicus curiae ensured a “sharp adversarial
presentation” of the “substantial argument for the constitutionality of § 3 of
DOMA.”30 Second, dismissal of the appeal would result in years of litigation as
district courts around the country issued conflicting judgments and awaited a
definitive ruling from the Supreme Court.31 The Court cautioned that “difficulties”
may arise “if this were a common practice in ordinary cases,” but expressed
concern that a contrary rule would mean “the Supreme Court’s primary role in
determining the constitutionality of a law that has inflicted real injury on a plaintiff
who has brought a justiciable legal claim would become only secondary to the
President’s.”32 By the same token, the Court warned of “grave challenges to the
separation of powers” when the Executive can “nullify Congress’ enactment solely
on its own initiative and without any determination from the Court.”33
The most striking aspect of the standing holding in Windsor is the Court’s
threshold determination that “adverseness” is merely a matter of prudential
standing. Never in the history of the distinction between Article III and prudential
standing had the Court categorized adverseness that way. Prudential standing
traditionally refers to a handful of well-known limits on federal jurisdiction (such
as third-party standing and the “zone of interests” requirement),34 and until Windsor
adverseness had never made the list. To the contrary, the Court frequently had
described adverseness as a central purpose or component of the Article III injuryin-fact requirement,35 alongside other purposes like the separation of powers and

30. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687–88.
31. Id. at 2688.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004) (discussing
rules against third-party standing, generalized grievances, claims by plaintiffs outside the
law’s “zone of interests,” and claims involving domestic relations, but acknowledging that
“we have not exhaustively defined the prudential dimensions of standing doctrine”). No
prominent treatise on federal courts has described non-adverseness as an aspect of prudential
standing. See, e.g., 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531, at 16 (3d ed. 2008 & Supp. 2013) (noting
several limits, with no discussion of adverseness, but acknowledging that “the doctrines have
changed continually”); EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 19.1(b), at
919 (9th ed. 2007) (listing several “generally recognized” considerations, with no mention of
adverseness).
35. See, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2028 (2011) (stating that Article III
requires a “continuing interest in the dispute” on the part of the “opposing party,” to ensure
“that the case features that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 542
(1986); City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers
Union of the U.S., Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 382–83 (1980); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 176–80 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
204 (1962). Those cases, presumably, were the basis for the dissent’s insistence that
“adverseness between the parties” is a “quite separate Article III requirement” in addition to
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judicial restraint.36 When “both litigants desire precisely the same result” on appeal,
the Court had repeatedly held, there is “no case or controversy within the meaning
of Art. III of the Constitution.”37 Even Justice Kennedy, who authored the majority
opinion in Windsor, previously had written that Article III limits, not merely
prudential considerations, bar the Court from hearing appeals by a party that
prevailed in the lower courts.38 Unsurprisingly, given that history, in Windsor
neither the United States,39 nor the plaintiff,40 nor any private-party amicus before
the Court41 suggested that adverseness was merely a matter of prudential
standing.42 Although Justice Scalia’s dissent contains its share of excesses (as
discussed below), he did not exaggerate in accusing the majority of a “breathtaking
revolution in our Article III jurisprudence” on this score.43
The Court acknowledged that prevailing parties generally have no right to
appeal, but pointed to two previous decisions, Deposit Guaranty National Bank of
Jackson, Mississippi v. Roper44 and Camreta v. Greene,45 as evidence that this rule
injury, traceability, and redressability. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2701–03 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Non-adverseness, it should be noted, also has been cited as a justification for
some prudential-standing limits. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751
v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 555–57 (1996) (third-party standing); Sec’y of State v.
Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 955 (1984) (same).
36. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
37. Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47, 48 (1971) (per curiam);
see also GTE Sylvania, 445 U.S. at 383; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911).
38. Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at2037 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The rule against hearing
appeals or accepting petitions for certiorari by prevailing parties is related to the Article III
prohibition against issuing advisory opinions.”); see id. at 2040 (faulting the majority for an
“erroneous and unbounded exception to an essential principle of judicial restraint”).
39. See Brief for the United States on the Jurisdictional Questions at 7, 11–12, 25,
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307) (arguing that “Article III adverseness” was present,
although also contending that INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), treated the lack of
disagreement between parties as prudential, an argument discussed infra notes 51–58 and
accompanying text).
40. See Brief on the Jurisdictional Questions for Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at
21, 26–27, 31–35, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307).
41. The only party before the Court to rely on that distinction was BLAG, in urging that
the United States lacked standing. See Brief on Jurisdiction for Respondent the Bipartisan
Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives at 35–36, Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (No. 12-307). Amici on the jurisdictional questions did not. See Brief of Constitutional
Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner (Jurisdictional Questions) at 25,
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307); Motion for Leave to File and Amici Curiae of
Former Attorneys General Edwin Meese III and John Ashcroft on Jurisdiction and in
Support of None of the Parties at 3–10, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307); Brief for
Amici Curiae Former Senior Justice Department Officials and Former Counsels to the
President on Jurisdiction at 18–20, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307) [hereinafter
Former Justice Officials’ Br. in Windsor]; Brief of Amicus Curiae the Honorable John K.
Olson in Support of Respondent Addressing Jurisdiction at 12–14, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(No. 12-307).
42. See Reply Brief for Court-Appointed Amica Curiae on Jurisdiction, Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307) (never addressing the distinction).
43. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2702 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
44. 445 U.S. 326 (1980).
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is a matter of prudential rather than Article III standing.46 In fact, the portions of
those opinions quoted by the Court related to statutory standing and certiorari
practice, not prudential standing.47 More fundamentally, both cases involved
appellants who received a favorable lower-court judgment but lost on some discrete
and important issue, in a manner that caused them continuing injury. In Roper, a
named plaintiff whose individual claim was satisfied sought to appeal from the
denial of class certification;48 in Greene, government officials who prevailed on
qualified immunity sought to appeal from a determination that they violated the
Constitution.49 There was thus crisp adverseness as to the issues actually being
litigated on appeal. Indeed, the Court in Greene considered that fact essential to its
jurisdiction under Article III, stating unequivocally that the Article III case-orcontroversy requirement means that “the opposing party . . . must have an ongoing
interest in the dispute, so that the case features ‘that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues.’”50 In Windsor the Court said exactly the
opposite, holding that Article III permits an appeal by the government even if it
obtains precisely the result it wants on every issue below.
Before Windsor, the only hint that adverseness might be merely a matter of
prudential standing appeared in a single sentence in INS v. Chadha,51 another case
in which the Executive refused to defend a law against constitutional attack. There
the Court considered whether a federal court of appeals had jurisdiction to review a
challenge to an immigration statute that the United States conceded was
unconstitutional. The Court indicated that “there may be prudential, as opposed to
Art. III, concerns about sanctioning the adjudication of these cases in the absence
of any participant supporting the validity of [the law],” but concluded that the court
of appeals had “properly dispelled any such concerns” by accepting briefs from the
House and Senate.52
The unusual posture of Chadha, however, readily distinguished that case from
Windsor. Most cases that come before a federal court of appeals originate in federal
district court, where a plaintiff must initially satisfy Article III standing
requirements. In such cases, distinctive questions about appellate standing may
arise, even if jurisdiction was clearly proper in the district court.53 In Chadha, by
contrast, the case originated in an Article I administrative proceeding, and an
45. 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
46. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687.
47. See Greene, 131 S. Ct. at 2029–30 (describing rules of “federal appellate practice”
related to the conservation of judicial resources, not prudential standing); Roper, 445 U.S. at
333–34 (distinguishing between Article III standing and the “collateral judgment” rule, an
issue of statutory standing under 28 U.S.C. § 1291). Remarkably, the Court in Windsor
quoted a key passage from Roper but omitted the words “collateral to the judgment” from
the opinion. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687.
48. Roper, 445 U.S. at 332–33; see Greene, 131 S. Ct. at 2039 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the appellant in Roper suffered a continuing injury from the court’s
allegedly erroneous procedural ruling).
49. Greene, 131 S. Ct. at 2028.
50. Id. at 2028 (quoting City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983)).
51. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
52. Id. at 940.
53. Both Windsor and Perry fit that description because both cases originated in federal
district court.
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aggrieved party subject to a deportation order sought direct review in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Because the court of appeals in Chadha was
the first Article III court to hear the case, it faced the kind of initial standing
questions usually confronted by district courts. As a matter of Article III standing,
the agency’s order to deport the party seeking review easily satisfied the
requirement of a personal injury.54 Thus, in context, the Court’s statement that
adverseness raised merely “prudential” concerns—a statement focused solely on
the court of appeals55—is best understood as affirming the constitutional power of
federal courts that initially hear a case to enter judgment even in the absence of
adverseness. That statement should not be surprising, given the federal courts’
longstanding practice of entering default judgments and consent orders when no
adverse party defends against a suit.56
Indeed, in the thirty years following Chadha, the Court’s suggestion that
adverseness raises merely prudential concerns was almost entirely ignored by
courts and commentators. Before Windsor, not a single court or treatise had relied
upon Chadha’s distinction between constitutional and prudential standing.57 So far
as my research has disclosed, it had been cited only once, in a footnote in a student
law review note.58
None of this necessarily means that the prudential-balancing framework adopted
in Windsor is undesirable as a matter of policy or indefensible as a matter of
constitutional interpretation.59 To the contrary, as discussed below, preserving the
executive option to enforce but not defend laws is consonant with the Department
of Justice’s longstanding practice, and on balance may reduce interbranch conflict.
But make no mistake—the holding of Windsor depended on a sharp break with
prior precedent on the boundary between Article III and prudential standing.

54. See id. at 928, 936, 939–40.
55. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the House and Senate were partyappellants in their own right, again leaving no doubt about injury or adverseness. See id. at
928, 930 n.5, 939.
56. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 34, § 3530, at 695–96 (noting the power of federal courts
to enter default judgments, to accept guilty pleas in criminal cases, and to enter consent
decrees despite the lack of “any dispute as to facts or remedy”).
57. See, e.g., id. at 705 (calling Chadha a “good illustration of the reasons for finding a
case or controversy” when executive officials agree that a law is unconstitutional but
continue to enforce it, with no discussion of prudential standing); GRESSMAN ET AL., supra
note 34, § 2.5, at 86–87 (discussing Chadha’s implications for statutory standing under
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1), but not relying on any distinction between constitutional and prudential
standing). Only one court before Windsor had even considered that distinction, and it
concluded that a lack of adverseness renders a case non-justiciable. See State ex rel. City of
Crestwood v. Lohman, 895 S.W.2d 22, 30–32 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). It declined to hold, as a
concurring judge proposed, that the lack of adverseness raised merely prudential, rather than
constitutional, concerns. See id. at 34 (Stith, J., concurring) (citing Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940).
58. See Note, Executive Discretion and the Congressional Defense of Statutes, 92 YALE
L.J. 970, 994 n.86 (1983).
59. See Joan Steinman, Shining a Light in a Dim Corner: Standing to Appeal and the
Right to Defend a Judgment in the Federal Courts, 38 GA. L. REV. 813, 842–43 (2004)
(arguing that “unbundling standing to appeal from Article III would be defensible and would
have some advantages”).
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B. New Restrictions on Who Can Speak for States in Perry
In Perry, two same-sex couples filed suit in federal district court challenging the
constitutionality of Proposition 8, a statewide ballot initiative that prohibited samesex marriage in California.60 State executive officials declined to defend the law,
but the district court permitted the official sponsors of the initiative (“the
sponsors”) to intervene as defendants.61 When the district court sided with the
plaintiffs, enjoining enforcement of Proposition 8, state officials declined to
appeal.62 Instead, the sponsors appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.63 After certifying a question to the California Supreme Court concerning
the authority of initiative sponsors under state law,64 a panel of the Ninth Circuit
unanimously held that the sponsors had standing.65
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the sponsors lacked Article III
standing to appeal.66 The sponsors conceded, and the Court unanimously agreed,
that they lacked standing based on their own injuries.67 Instead, they contended that
they had standing to appeal on behalf of the State. Under California law, the
sponsors of any initiative are authorized “to appear and assert the state’s interest in
the initiative’s validity and to appeal a judgment invalidating the measure when the
public officials who ordinarily defend the measure or appeal such a judgment
decline to do so.”68 According to the California Supreme Court, that authority
derives from the “unique role” that official sponsors play in the initiative process,
including collecting signatures, drafting the official statement, and paying relevant
fees.69
Based on earlier cases, that seemed like a credible basis for standing. The Court
had repeatedly held that a judgment enjoining the enforcement of state law inflicts
an injury on the State, meaning that someone has standing to appeal on the State’s

60. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2660 (2013).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011) (certifying question);
Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1007 (Cal. 2011) (responding to certified question).
65. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2012). The panel also issued a
divided judgment affirming the district court on the merits. Id. at 1096.
66. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2668. The Court dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction and vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment, but left the district court’s order intact. Id.
67. Id. at 2661–63; id. at 2668–69 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (focusing on the injury to
California, not to the sponsors themselves). The initiative sponsors were four individuals and
an organization called “ProtectMarriage.com—Yes on 8, A Project of California Renewal.”
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at ii, Hollingworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 12-144).
Although they supported Proposition 8 and wished to defend it, the Court has repeatedly
rejected Article III “citizen standing” based on generalized grievances about government.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2662.
68. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d at 1007; see id. at 1024.
69. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2669–70. However textually dubious in light of
the state election code, the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law was
explicit, emphatic, and authoritative. See id. at 2670 (noting that the California Supreme
Court repeated that language “more than a half-dozen times and in no uncertain terms”).
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behalf to an Article III court.70 Although state law typically assigns that
responsibility to an executive official like a state attorney general, nothing in the
Constitution requires that arrangement.71 In Karcher v. May,72 the leaders of both
houses of the New Jersey legislature intervened as defendants after the state
attorney general refused to defend a state statute against a constitutional
challenge.73 When the district court struck down the statute, the legislative leaders
appealed.74 The Supreme Court held that Article III standing was proper because
state law, as embodied in state-court decisions, authorized the leaders “to represent
the State’s interests in both the District Court and the Court of Appeals.”75 Later in
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona76 the Court expressed, in dictum, “grave
doubts” about the standing of initiative sponsors in Arizona to appeal from a
judgment striking down the law they sponsored.77 But the Court stressed the
absence of authorization under state law, noting that “we are aware of no Arizona
law appointing initiative sponsors as agents of the people of Arizona to defend, in
lieu of public officials, the constitutionality of initiatives made law of the State.”78
Thus, the initiative sponsors in Perry had reason for optimism. They maintained
that, consistent with state law, they essentially had stepped into the shoes of the
state attorney general and had standing to bring an appeal on behalf of the State.
The Court rejected that theory, but only after announcing two new Article III
restrictions on who can file an appeal on behalf of a State.79 First, the Court read

70. See, e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986) (“Had the State of Illinois
invoked this Court’s appellate jurisdiction . . . the ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ requirement would
have been met, for a State has standing to defend the constitutionality of its statute.”). An
official named as a defendant and bound by a declaratory judgment and injunction, for
example, unquestionably has Article III standing to appeal. Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579,
2592 (2009).
71. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2664.
72. 484 U.S. 72 (1987).
73. Id. at 75.
74. Id. at 75–76.
75. Id. at 81–82 (refusing to vacate the court of appeals’ decision because it is “wrong
as a matter of New Jersey law” to suggest that the presiding officers cannot represent the
legislature in litigation). Although that passage does not expressly discuss “standing,” the
Court’s rejection of mootness arguments in the following paragraph makes clear that the
Court considered Article III objections to the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. See id. at
82–83.
76. 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
77. Id. at 65–66.
78. Id.at 65 (reiterating that, under Karcher, state legislators have standing to appeal “if
state law authorizes legislators to represent the State’s interests”). The Court also noted that
the sponsors “are not elected representatives” and that it had never held that initiative
proponents are “Article-III-qualified defenders of the measures they advocated.” But the
sponsors in that case argued that they had standing to assert the State’s interest even in the
absence of any state-law authorization to do so, asserting “a quasi-legislative interest in
defending the constitutionality of the measure they successfully sponsored,” and “the funds
and effort they expended to achieve adoption of” the measure. Id. The sponsors in Perry, by
contrast, relied on an express authorization under state law. See supra notes 68–69 and
accompanying text.
79. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by Justices Scalia,
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan.
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Karcher as imposing an Article III requirement that lawsuits and appeals on behalf
of states may be brought only by “state officers, acting in an official capacity,” and
not by “private parties.”80 Second, the Court extracted from dicta in Arizonans for
Official English an Article III requirement that lawsuits and appeals on behalf of
states may be brought only by parties with a formal agency relationship to the
State, including a fiduciary obligation and a right of control.81 Both restrictions
depended on aggressive and questionable extensions of the Court’s previous
decisions.
According to the first restriction, only “state officers” may initiate a federalcourt lawsuit or appeal on behalf of a State, not private parties.82 The Court claimed
to find “compelling precedent” for that rule in Karcher,83 but its reading of the case
was strained. In Karcher, the Court held that the leaders of the state legislature
initially had Article III standing to appeal because state law authorized them “to
represent the State’s interests.”84 Shortly after the court of appeals issued its
judgment, however, the leaders were voted out of office, and their successors in the
legislature declined to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.85 The Court issued a
narrow holding: it lacked jurisdiction because the officials had been substituted out
of the case under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(1), and were no longer
“parties” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2).86 Accordingly, as a basis for a
new Article III “private party” restriction, Karcher is doubly inadequate. Far from
suggesting that state officials are the only people constitutionally permitted to
appeal on behalf of a State, the Court simply noted that the legislators were
officials who had intervened in their official capacity, and that they could not
continue the suit in any other capacity.87 Moreover, the holding in Karcher was
grounded in statutory jurisdiction under § 1254(2), with no discussion of Article
III’s case-or-controversy requirement.88

80. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2665 (2013) (emphasis in original).
81. See Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2666–67.
82. Id. at 2665 (emphasizing that the sponsors “hold no office and have always
participated in this litigation solely as private parties”).
83. Id. at 2657. The majority also discussed Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986), in
which the Court held that a doctor who intervened as a defendant in the district court lacked
standing to appeal when the State declined to do so. Id. at 63–67. The doctor was a private
party with only a generalized interest in the case, and he made no claim that state law
specifically authorized him to appear in court and to defend the state’s interests on appeal.
See id. at 64–67. Although the State filed a letter with the U.S. Supreme Court declaring its
position in litigation “essentially co-terminous” with the doctor’s, the Court deemed that
“mere expression of interest” insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy. Id. at
61–64.
84. Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 81–82 (1987).
85. Id. at 76–78.
86. Id. at 81–83.
87. See id. at 78–81 (concluding that “intervention as presiding legislative officers does
not entitle them to appeal in their other individual and professional capacities” and carefully
inspecting the trial court record to confirm that they initially intervened only in an official
capacity).
88. See id. at 77–81 (mentioning that the power of federal courts is circumscribed “by
Article III of the Constitution and by the federal statutes enacted thereunder,” but proceeding
to discuss only statutory jurisdiction).
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According to the second restriction, Article III bars any person from initiating a
federal court action or appeal on behalf of a State without “the basic features of an
agency relationship” with the State.89 Specifically, the Court held that a person
acting on behalf of the State must (1) be subject to “the principal’s right to control
the agent’s actions,”90 (2) owe a fiduciary obligation to the principal that includes
sensitivity to “resource constraints” and “public opinion,”91 and (3) enjoy a
complete indemnification by the State against an award of attorney fees.92 None of
those requirements was evident from the Court’s previous standing decisions. It
would take a heroic reading of the single reference to “agents of the people of
Arizona” in dictum in Arizonans for Official English93 to superimpose the whole of
the Restatement (Third) of Agency onto Article III. Credit instead goes to Walter
Dellinger, the Duke law professor and former Assistant Attorney General whose
influential brief on standing was cited by the Justices at oral argument and in the
majority opinion.94
To be sure, the Court’s previous standing cases did not foreclose the detailed
restrictions announced in Perry. But the common understanding, reflected in the
Ninth Circuit’s unanimous opinion, was that states have the “prerogative, as
independent sovereigns, to decide for themselves who may assert their interests.”95
That understanding was based, in part, on the long history of actions and appeals
brought on behalf of States by private parties with no formal agency relationship.
The most prominent example, discussed briefly by the Court in Perry, is the
qui tam action. Since the first Congress, qui tam suits have authorized private
persons (“relators” or “informers”) to bring a civil action on the behalf of a State
(or the United States) and to collect a portion of the proceeds as a kind of bounty.96

89. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666–67 (2013) (citing 1 RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f (2006)).
90. Id. at 2666 (quoting 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f).
91. Id. at 2667.
92. Id.
93. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997).
94. See Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2667 (“[T]he proponents apparently have an unelected
appointment for an unspecified period of time as defenders of the initiative, however and to
whatever extent they choose to defend it.” (quoting Brief for Walter Dellinger as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents on the Issue of Standing at 23, Perry, 133 U.S. 2652 (No.
12-144))); Perry Arg. Tr., supra note 7, at 10–11 (statement by Justice Breyer that “the
Dellinger brief . . . is making a strong argument”).
95. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1071 (9th Cir. 2012); cf. Vikram Amar, Revisiting
Standing: Proposition 8 in the Ninth Circuit, JURIST (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://jurist.org/forum/2012/02/vikram-amar-marriage-standing.php (arguing that state law
that “explicitly deputizes a particular proponent of [a ballot] initiative as the party entrusted
to defend the constitutionality of the law” would have standing, but concluding that
California voters could not have intended that kind of deputization in Proposition 8 because
the California Supreme Court had not yet clarified the powers of initiative sponsors).
96. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2006) (qui tam action under the False Claims
Act); see also Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765,
774–78 (2000) (describing history of qui tam actions in the United States); Richard A. Bales,
A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 381, 387 & n.37; Harold J. Krent,
Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History,
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Relators in qui tam cases need not have suffered any personal injury, need not be
government officials, and need not have any formal agency relationship,97 yet the
Supreme Court has held that qui tam relators enjoy Article III standing to sue on
the government’s behalf.98 The Court brushed aside that history in a parenthetical,
calling qui tam suits “readily distinguishable”99 because they involve “a partial
assignment of the Government’s damages claim and a ‘well nigh conclusive’
tradition” in English and American courts.100
To my mind, a better example is the long history of private criminal prosecution
in America during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For over a century, the
law of many states authorized private parties to initiate criminal prosecutions in the
State’s name to redress injuries to the State as sovereign.101 Private prosecutors
need not have suffered any personal injury, were not public officials, and had no
formal agency relationship with the State. Yet they routinely filed court actions on
behalf of the State to enforce the criminal law, as authorized by state procedures.
Although Article III courts may not have exercised jurisdiction over private
criminal prosecutions,102 other federal courts and many state courts
38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 296–303 (1989); Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General
and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REV. 589, 600–01 (2005).
97. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (authorizing suit by any “private person”).
98. Vt. Agency, 529 U.S. at 774.
99. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2665.
100. Id. (quoting Vt. Agency, 529 U.S. at 777). The Court apparently reasoned that,
whereas qui tam suits involve claims for money damages and relators stand to benefit
personally, initiative sponsors seeking to defend state law from constitutional attack have no
personal stake in the case. See Kyle La Rose, Comment, The Injury-in-Fact Barrier to
Initiative Proponent Standing: How Article III Might Prevent Federal Courts from
Enforcing Direct Democracy, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1717, 1739 (2012). But in upholding the
standing of qui tam relators, the Court expressly rejected the argument that the relator’s
potential “bounty” could satisfy Article III, noting that it would not redress any personal
injury to the relator. Vt. Agency, 529 U.S. at 772 (reasoning that, although a relator stands to
gain from a victory in the case, the same could be said of “someone who has placed a wager
upon the outcome”).
101. See Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 130 S. Ct. 2184, 2188–89 (2010)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting from dismissal as improvidently granted) (discussing the long
history of private prosecution conducted “on behalf of the sovereign” in England and
America); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 127–28 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (same); JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A
SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 3–39 (1980); ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800–1880, at 1–2 (1989); Morrison, supra note 96, at 601–02.
Private prosecutions continue in some form in many states. See John D. Bessler, The Public
Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511, 529–40
(1994); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private
Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 423 (2009); Joan Meier, The “Right” to a Disinterested
Prosecutor of Criminal Contempt: Unpacking Public and Private Interests, 70 WASH. U.
L.Q. 85, 103–07 (1992).
102. Compare Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing
Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 700–01 (2004) (contending that only territorial and D.C.
courts entertained private criminal prosecutions in the federal system), with Stephanie A.J.
Dangel, Note, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v. Olson and the
Framers’ Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069, 1083 n.84 (1990) (arguing that private prosecution of

80

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:67

did.103 At a minimum, the widespread practice of private criminal prosecution is in
tension with the Court’s suggestion that actions brought by private parties on behalf
of a State are not “historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial
process.”104
None of this is to suggest that Perry’s new restrictions for suits on behalf of a
State somehow contravened clear precedent. The standing of ballot initiative
sponsors was an issue of first impression for the Court, and qui tam suits and
private criminal prosecutions are hardly dispositive in light of their long historical
pedigree. Nor does it suggest that the Court’s requirements are unwise as a matter
of policy. Insisting on an official capacity and an agency relationship can guard
against “rogue” sponsors who act in their own interests, rather than that of the
State. The point, instead, is that the restrictions announced in Perry required
aggressive extensions of the Court’s previous decisions and run contrary to a
common understanding that states are free to decide for themselves who asserts
their interests.
The abrupt changes to the law of Article III standing in Windsor and Perry
ought to fuel speculation that the Justices’ reasoning was colored by concern about
the merits. The charge that judges’ decisions on standing are driven by their views
of the merits is frequently leveled,105 but there is special reason to think that it
happened here. The marriage cases attracted intense public attention. Before they
were decided, many commentators predicted—and some urged—that the Court
federal common-law crimes may have occurred in the Court’s early years). The lack of
private prosecutions in Article III courts did not stem from standing requirements, but from
choices made by Congress. One was a requirement of public prosecution for all federal
crimes. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93; United States v. Murphy,
41 U.S. 203, 209 (1842); Woolhandler & Nelson, supra, at 697; Dangel, supra, at 1083.
Another was the Supreme Court’s asymmetrical appellate jurisdiction in federal-question
cases, see Judiciary Act of 1789 § 25, which made it impossible for States to appeal from
state-court decisions erroneously accepting a federal-law defense.
103. The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, for example, routinely exercised
jurisdiction over private criminal prosecutions brought in the name of the United States. See,
e.g., United States v. Birch, 24 F. Cas. 1147 (C.C.D.C. 1809) (No. 14,595); United States v.
Dulany, 25 F. Cas. 923 (C.C.D.C. 1809) (No. 15,000); United States v. Lyles, 26 F. Cas.
1024 (C.C.D.C. 1806) (No. 15,645); United States v. Sandford, 27 F. Cas. 952 (C.C.D.C.
1806) (No. 16,221); Virginia v. Dulany, 28 F. Cas. 1223 (C.C.D.C. 1802) (No. 16,958). That
court was organized under Article I, see Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 3, 2 Stat. 103, 105–
06, but its judges apparently believed themselves to be governed by the Article III, see
United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 160 n.2 (1805) (describing the court’s holding
that D.C. judges enjoyed Article III’s salary protections).
104. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 95 (1968)); see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998)
(“We have always taken [the case-or-controversy requirement] to mean cases and
controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.”).
105. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 34, § 3531, at 17–19 (noting that “many exasperated
courts and commentators” believe that “standing doctrine is no more than a convenient tool
to avoid uncomfortable issues or to disguise a surreptitious ruling on the merits”); see also
F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275,
304–06 (2008); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 650 (1985); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?,
77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1742–43 (1999).
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might prefer a middle-ground outcome to a sweeping constitutional ruling that
would require same-sex marriage in every state.106 That remains a leading
realpolitik explanation for the split decision.107The fact that the decisions broke
new ground and substantially reformulated appellate standing rules tends to
reinforce that account.
II. EXECUTIVE NON-DEFENSE OF FEDERAL LAW AFTER THE MARRIAGE CASES
Despite its novelty, there is reason for cautious optimism about the new
appellate standing regime announced in Perry and Windsor. From a separation-ofpowers perspective, the most important consequence of the decisions is the
preservation and strengthening of the Executive’s power to enforce but not defend
federal laws that it deems unconstitutional. Used sparingly, that power can reduce
interbranch friction and benefit both the Executive and the courts. The key risk
going forward is that the Court’s endorsement will tempt the Executive to overuse
the non-defense option, to the detriment of all three branches.
A. Executive Non-Defense: The Case for Optimism
1. The Executive Branch
For the Executive Branch, Windsor represented a crucial test of the power to
enforce laws while refusing to defend them from constitutional challenge. The
Executive has frequently claimed that power,108 although it has exercised it

106. See, e.g., Michael McConnell, The Constitution and Same-Sex Marriage, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 22, 2013, at A15 (warning that the Court “endangers its own legitimacy” when it
seeks to resolve divisive moral-legal questions, and urging the Court “to resolve these cases
without setting a precedent either way”); Emily Bazelon, How the Supreme Court Should
Rule on Gay Marriage, SLATE (Mar. 4, 2013, 4:11 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news
_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/03/supreme_court_s_prop_8_case_the_justices_should
_choose_a_modest_approach.html (urging the Court to take “medium-sized steps” rather
than holding that gay marriage is constitutionally required in all states).
107. See Michael McConnell & Jeffrey Rosen, Town Hall Debate: McConnell and Rosen
on the Same-Sex Marriage Decisions, CONST. DAILY (June 26, 2013), http://blog
.constitutioncenter.org/2013/06/town-hall-debate-mcconnell-and-rosen-on-the-same-sex
-marriage-decisions (attributing the narrow result in part to Justice Kennedy’s unwillingness
to hold that the Constitution requires same-sex marriage in all states); Kermit Roosevelt, The
Supreme Court’s Gay Marriage Decisions Are Modest Steps Towards Greater Equality,
PENN LAW (June 26, 2013), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/news/2703-prof-kermit
-roosevelt-the-supreme-courts-gay (calling Perry “the most modest and incremental decision
it could have rendered without going against the cause of same-sex marriage”); see also
Jason Farago, Did the Supreme Court’s Liberals Balk at a More Pro-Gay Prop 8 Ruling?,
GUARDIAN.COM (June 28, 2013, 3:10 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world
/2013/jun/28/us-supreme-court-doma-fate-america; Noah Feldman, Supreme Court Prolongs
Gay-Marriage Struggle, BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2013, 12:22 PM), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2013-06-26/supreme-court-prolongs-gay-marriage-struggle.html.
108. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Abner J. Mikva,
White House Counsel ¶ 5 (Nov. 2, 1994) [hereinafter Dellinger Memorandum], available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/nonexcut.htm; see also Holder Letter, supra note 12.
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sparingly. Enforcement and non-defense allows a private party injured by an act of
Congress to challenge the law in court, effectively submitting the disagreement to
the judiciary. The rationale reflects, in part, the “desire to afford the Supreme Court
an opportunity to review the constitutional judgment of the legislative branch,”
rather than effectively invalidating the law through unilateral executive nonenforcement.109
Few scholars appreciate how close the marriage cases came to effectively
nullifying the power to enforce but not defend.110 In Windsor, three Justices
concluded that no one had standing to appeal from the district court’s order
declaring section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional. Had their view prevailed, the
United States would lack standing to appeal whenever it agreed with the judgment
below and did not seek redress of any injury.111 The same logic would bar appeals
by a prevailing plaintiff. In addition, Congress would lack standing to appeal
because striking down a law or otherwise impairing a branch’s power does not
inflict an Article III injury.112 As a result, successful constitutional challenges to
laws that the Executive declines to defend would be stranded in district court.
That would have frustrated the effectiveness of the executive non-defense
power. Decisions of federal district courts are not binding precedent, even in the
same district or before the same judge.113 To elevate the case to the appellate
courts, a district court would first need to reject the challenge, giving the plaintiff
standing to appeal. To proceed to the Supreme Court, a court of appeals would
need to reject the challenge as well. Thus, under the dissenters’ approach, the
success of enforce-but-do-not-defend would have been uneven. Rather than
securing a definitive judicial tiebreaker in cases where the President and Congress
disagree about the constitutionality of a law,114 the Executive may only have been
able to rack up a series of non-binding district court judgments agreeing with its
position. Review by appellate courts would be unpredictable and, ironically, the
stronger the Executive’s interpretation of the Constitution, the more likely district
courts would agree and thereby foreclose further review.
But the threat to the executive non-defense power was even more serious. For
the three dissenters, even the district court acted inappropriately in Windsor by

109. Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 108, ¶ 5; see Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (But Not
Defending) ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws, 98 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1069 (2012) (“The creation and
preservation of a justiciable controversy is a goal routinely stipulated in official defenses of
enforcement-litigation gaps.”).
110. An amicus brief filed by former Justice Department officials was the only filing
before the Court to explicitly discuss that possibility. See Former Justice Officials’ Br. in
Windsor, supra note 41, at 23 (warning that if the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction, “the
Executive would effectively be required to abandon the infrequently used but important
practice”).
111. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2698–703 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Alito concurred with that view, but would have held that the Court had
jurisdiction based on BLAG’s standing. See id. at 2711–12 (Alito, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 2704 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. See, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7 (2011) (citing 18 JAMES
WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.02[1][d], at 134–26 (3d ed. 2011)).
114. See Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 108, ¶ 5 (decision to enforce may reflect in
part the possibility that “the Supreme Court” can review the issue).
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“referee[ing] this friendly scrimmage.”115 Although not doubting the district court’s
jurisdiction, they argued that when the Executive chooses to enforce a law but
concedes its unconstitutionality, “the litigation should end in an order or a consent
decree enjoining enforcement.”116 Rather than writing an opinion and adjudicating
the constitutional issue on the merits—which the dissenters considered
inappropriate due to the lack of adverseness—the district court should simply enter
an order to remedy the plaintiff’s injury. Some scholars have expressed a similar
view. Michael McConnell argues that “the moment” state officials declined to
defend Proposition 8 in Perry, the district court “should have issued a default
judgment in favor of the two couples who were plaintiffs, allowing them to marry
and dismissing the case.”117 Similarly, Vikram Amar contends that the district court
had a justiciable case or controversy “for the limited purpose of granting a default
judgment, but not for purposes of holding a trial to adjudicate the merits of the
plaintiffs’ claims.”118 It is not clear whether the dissenters believe that district
courts must take that action to comply with Article III, or merely should do so in
the sound exercise of their discretion, but the effect would have been the same.
Had the dissenters prevailed on that score, Windsor would have effectively
gutted the executive power to enforce but not defend. If district courts should do
nothing more than enter simple orders or consent decrees, then the plaintiffs (and
acquiescing Executive) would always prevail in district court and would be unable
to appeal. Indeed, with no opinion adjudicating the merits, no court would ever
consider the constitutional challenge.119 Enforcement and non-defense would be
pointless, incapable of securing any form of judicial review. At the same time, it
would be costly. Because district courts ordinarily have power to grant relief only
to the parties before them,120 and an immediate default order would rule out

115. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2702 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116. Id.
117. McConnell & Rosen, supra note 107; see also Huq, supra note 109, at 1029–30
(speculating that dismissal or a default judgment might be constitutionally required if
Congress did not intervene to defend a statute).
118. Vikram David Amar, Precisely What Will, or Should, Happen to Same-Sex
Marriage in California if the Supreme Court Finds in Hollingsworth v. Perry That the
(Apr.
11,
2013),
Proposition
8
Sponsors
Lack
Standing?,
JUSTIA
http://verdict.justia.com/2013/04/11/precisely-what-will-or-should-happen
-to-same-sex
-marriage-in-california-if-the-supreme-court-finds-in-hollingsworth-v-perry-that-the
-proposition-8-sponsors-lack-standing.
119. Stacy Pepper, The Defenseless Marriage Act: The Legitimacy of President Obama’s
Refusal to Defend DOMA § 3, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 25–26 (2013) (explaining that a
default judgment would deprive the district court of an opportunity to resolve the merits of
the constitutional challenge).
120. See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 478 (1995) (“[W]e
neither want nor need to provide relief to nonparties when a narrower remedy will fully
protect the litigants.”); Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 96
F.3d 1390, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Courts do not write legislation for members of the public
at large; they frame decrees and judgments binding on the parties before them.”). This is not
to deny that district courts sometimes enter broad injunctions that purport to dictate
defendants’ actions with respect to third parties, as the district court did in Perry. But
ordinarily a defendant can appeal to a court capable of announcing binding precedent, or will
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procedural devices like class actions, a single judgment would not compel the
Executive to cease all enforcement of the challenged law. The Executive would be
left to “defend” a multiplicity of suits, and injured plaintiffs would be compelled to
file actions seriatim, with no discernible benefit for anyone.
That would have been unfortunate, and the outcome in Windsor should be
greeted with cautious optimism. That assessment begins from the conventional (but
by no means universal) premise that, in unusual circumstances, it is appropriate for
the Executive to facilitate judicial review by enforcing but refusing to defend a
challenged law. A lengthy defense of that position is beyond the scope of this
Essay, but here is a greatly abbreviated version. The Executive has a responsibility
to interpret the Constitution in performing its functions (constitutional
“departmentalism”),121 but it should carry out that responsibility with humility,
according respect to the opinions of other branches.122 Thus, the Executive should
indulge a strong presumption that acts of Congress are constitutional and ordinarily
should enforce and defend them. In rare circumstances,123 however, when Congress
and the Executive disagree about the constitutionality of a law, enforcement and
non-defense permits the judiciary to weigh in as a kind of tiebreaker. That is
sometimes desirable. Although refusing to defend a statute may create friction with
Congress,124 unilateral non-enforcement risks even greater friction and more drastic
and costly forms of retaliation.125

choose voluntarily to comply rather than face further litigation in which the defendant will
lose because of issue preclusion. In the dissenters’ view, neither the plaintiff nor the
government would have standing to appeal, and future plaintiffs could not benefit from the
district-court judgment because offensive issue preclusion is unavailable against the
government. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984) (holding that “nonmutual
offensive collateral estoppel simply does not apply against the government”).
121. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 918,
924–25 (1990); Abner S. Greene, Interpretive Schizophrenia: How Congressional Standing
Can Solve the Enforce-But-Not-Defend Problem, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 579 (2012);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the
Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221 (1994); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive
Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1996); Keith E.
Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses,
80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 778–79 (2002).
122. See Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 108, ¶¶ 3–4; David Barron,
Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The President’s Non-enforcement Power,
63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 90, 92 (2000); Greene, supra note 121, at 581; Dawn E.
Johnsen, Presidential Non-enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes,
63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 17 (2000).
123. See Dawn Johnsen, The Obama Administration’s Decision to Defend Constitutional
Equality Rather Than the Defense of Marriage Act, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 599, 603–04
(2012); Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183,
1198–1206 (2012) (describing several “clusters” of cases in which the Executive historically
has declined to defend, including statutes for which no colorable defense can be advanced
and statutes that infringe on the Executive’s authority).
124. Meltzer, supra note 123, at 1220.
125. Greene, supra note 121, at 581, 591; Amanda Frost, Congress in Court,
59 UCLA L. REV. 914, 960–62 (2012); Carlin Meyer, Imbalance of Powers: Can
Congressional Lawsuits Serve as Counterweight?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 63, 84–93 (1992).
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I refer to this constitutional baseline as “conventional” not because of any
scholarly consensus—readers committed to robust versions of departmentalism
emphatically reject it126—but because it closely accords with the stated position and
actual practice of the Executive Branch.127 For more than seventy years, when
confronted with an act of Congress it believes is unconstitutional, the Executive on
occasion has deemed it preferable to commit the issue to the judiciary rather than
unilaterally refusing to enforce the statute. For two categories of cases, that practice
is particularly well-established: laws that impinge upon executive power, and laws
for which no reasonable constitutional argument can be advanced. Indeed,
Congress itself seems comfortable with non-defense in some circumstances,
demanding notice from the Executive Branch when it declines to enforce or defend
federal laws,128 and routinely extracting only a qualified promise to defend federal
laws from Justice Department officials at their Senate confirmation hearings.129
Even if the interbranch confrontation prompted by non-enforcement is not, in
Justice Scalia’s phrase, an “[u]nimaginable evil,”130 it may be a greater evil, and it
is certainly an avoidable evil. Permanently taking that option off the table would
have been unfortunate.
Happily, the marriage cases preserved the power to enforce but not defend. The
cases not only endorsed the exercise of appellate jurisdiction despite the lack of
traditional adverseness, but expressly acknowledged the “difficult choice” the
Executive faces after determining that a duly enacted law is unconstitutional.131 For
the Executive Branch, the result must have come as a relief.

126. See, e.g., Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 507, 570 (2012) (arguing that the President has a constitutional duty not to
defend statutes he deems unconstitutional); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s
Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613 (2008) (same); Michael B.
Rappaport, The Unconstitutionality of “Signing and Not-Enforcing,” 16 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 113, 122–23, 129 (2007) (same).
127. See Former Justice Officials’ Br. in Windsor, supra note 41, at 5–17 (describing the
Justice Department’s practices and views concerning executive non-defense).
128. See 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(A)–(B).
129. Meltzer, supra note 123, at 1218–20; see also, e.g., Confirmation Hearings on the
Nominations of Thomas Perrelli Nominee to Be Associate Attorney General of the United
States and Elena Kagan to Be Solicitor General of the United States: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 47 (2009) (statement of Elena Kagan) (“Traditionally,
outside of a very narrow band of cases involving the separation of powers, the Solicitor
General has defended any Federal statute in support of which any reasonable argument can
be made.”); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Paul D. Clement To Be Solicitor
General of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 6
(2005) (statement of Paul D. Clement) (“[O]utside a narrow band of cases implicating the
President’s Article II authority, the [Solicitor General’s] office will defend the
constitutionality of the acts of Congress as long as reasonable arguments can be made in the
statute’s defense.”).
130. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2704 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Our
system is designed for confrontation.”(emphasis in original)).
131. See id. at 2687–89.
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2. The Judiciary
The judiciary also stands to gain by preserving the executive power to enforce
but not defend. A contrary ruling would have sidelined the courts in a category of
cases where, in the ordinary course of litigation, Article III courts would have had
power to resolve constitutional questions. And contrary to Justice Scalia’s claims in
dissent, the marriage cases’ new standing rules do not represent a judicial “power
grab.” Rather than seizing fresh power for the judiciary, the decisions help to
consolidate judicial power in constitutional litigation.
In Windsor, the Court altered Article III standing rules to permit the government
to appeal after it successfully urges a district court to strike down a law.132 That
change by design makes it easier for the Supreme Court and federal appellate
courts to weigh in on unsettled constitutional questions. The Court defended that
result in part on efficiency grounds, noting that an immediate appeal by the
“winners” in district court can elevate an issue more quickly, more directly, and
with less investment of judicial resources than awaiting a future case in which a
losing plaintiff files an appeal.133 But it also invoked the separation of powers,
arguing that a contrary rule would undermine the Supreme Court’s “primary role in
determining the constitutionality of a law that has inflicted real injury on a plaintiff
who has brought a justiciable legal claim” and reiterating that “‘[i]t is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’”134
For Justice Scalia in dissent, that reasoning amounted to a “jaw-dropping” act of
self-aggrandizement by the judicial branch.135 He accused the majority of imposing
“black-robed supremacy” in the place of democratic self-rule, of breaching a
“barrier against judges’ intrusion into [the People]’s lives,” and of a conception of
“judicial power” better suited to foreign courts than American courts.136 Although
some passages focused on the Supreme Court,137 the dissent’s major theme was
overreach by the judiciary as a whole: “an assertion of judicial supremacy” over
Congress and the Executive.138
That line of criticism is misguided. Denying the government standing to appeal
in a case like Windsor is hardly an act of judicial modesty. As the dissent
acknowledged, the district court had proper Article III jurisdiction based on the
plaintiff’s claim of injury.139 Once a district court has considered the merits of a

132. See id. at 2685–89.
133. Id. at 2688.
134. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
135. Id. at 2698 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. See id. at 2697–98 (majority opinion “aggrandizes” the “power of this Court to
pronounce the law” based on “an exalted conception of the role of this institution in
America”); id. at 2698 (majority “envisions a Supreme Court standing (or rather enthroned)
at the apex of government”); id. at 2699, 2702–03 (judicial review not only is not “the
‘primary role’ of this Court” but “is not a separate, free-standing role at all” (emphasis in
original)).
138. Id. at 2698.
139. See id. at 2700, 2702 (arguing that “the suit should have ended” in the district court
“in an order or a consent decree enjoining enforcement”).
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claim, declared an act of Congress unconstitutional, and entered an order enjoining
its enforcement, the Judicial Branch already is thrust into the fray, and some
infringement on other branches of government is inevitable. Further review by the
Supreme Court or appellate courts might result in a reversal that upholds the law,
but dismissing the government’s appeal for lack of standing would do nothing to
extract the judiciary from the controversy.
The outcome in Perry powerfully illustrates the point. By dismissing the appeal
and vacating the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court ensured that no
appellate judges could weigh in on the constitutional challenge to Proposition 8.
But the district court’s order remained intact, and that judgment alone proved
sufficient to strike down a controversial but popularly enacted state law. The
federal Judicial Branch conclusively resolved the constitutional challenge, even if
the Supreme Court did not.
Thus, the new standing rules in Windsor are better understood as consolidating,
rather than expanding, judicial power in constitutional litigation. The majority
reasoned that a decision on the merits by the Supreme Court would carry several
advantages: promoting uniformity, avoiding prolonged litigation, conserving
judicial and party resources, and providing clear guidance to lower courts.140 That
assessment may sound self-congratulatory,141 but it closely tracks the widely
recognized functions performed by appellate courts. One key purpose of appellate
review is the development of law by announcing, clarifying, and harmonizing
governing legal rules.142 That function is particularly important for the Supreme
Court, which has a special charge to safeguard the uniformity and supremacy of
federal law.143 Appellate courts also can help to reduce the overall costs of
adjudication, particularly when recurring issues affect many cases.144 In addition,
the Court might well have mentioned error correction, another important function
performed by appellate courts.145 Appellate review in the federal system is
premised on the assumption that district court judges sometimes make errors, but
that the number of errors can be reduced by affording a panel of multiple judges an
opportunity to review a narrow set of claims and ample time to deliberate.146 That

140. Id. at 2688 (majority opinion).
141. Cf. id. at 2698 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s vision of “a Supreme
Court standing (or rather enthroned) at the apex of government”).
142. PAUL D. CARRINGTON, DANIEL J. MEADOR & MAURICE ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON
APPEAL 2–3 (1976); see also Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A
Preliminary Defense of How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 424–25 (2013) (describing law development as one of
the functions “consistently . . . offered” by scholars and judges describing appellate courts).
143. See infra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing the “essential functions”
thesis concerning the jurisdiction of the Article III courts).
144. Cf. Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction,
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 425 (1995) (arguing that, by harmonizing the law through error
correction, appellate review can capture “consequentialist advantages” through cost savings,
even if a higher court resolves conflicts “on its own initiative”).
145. Levy, supra note 142, at 424–25, 427.
146. See United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (because
appellate courts need not hear evidence and find facts, they can follow a “collaborative,
deliberative process” that “reduces the risk of judicial error on questions of law”).
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kind of accuracy is no less valuable in constitutional litigation than in other
contexts.147
In short, the Court deemed appellate review desirable in Windsor for the same
reasons that appellate review is desirable in other contexts. It sought not to expand
judicial power at the expense of other branches, but to consolidate that power and
to deploy it more effectively in the interests of uniformity, efficiency, and accuracy.
Because both the Executive and the courts stand to benefit from the Court’s
decision to preserve the executive non-defense option, there is reason for optimism
in the wake of the marriage cases.
B. Executive Non-Defense: The Case for Caution
At the same time, there is reason for caution. The Executive’s longstanding
reluctance to use the power to enforce but not defend may be attributable, in part, to
doubts about its lawfulness.148 In addition, before Windsor, the Executive could not
have been confident that it could seek appellate and Supreme Court review when it
“prevailed” in the district court following a decision not to defend. Lingering
concerns about the validity and effectiveness of the non-defense option may have
tempered the Executive’s enthusiasm for it.
The marriage cases could drastically change that calculus. The Court’s explicit
endorsement of executive non-defense, and its sensitivity to “the difficulty the
Executive faces” when it determines that an act of Congress is unconstitutional,149
should dispel concerns about judicial resistance to the practice. At the same time,
the Court has armed the Executive with an unprecedented power to appeal from
decisions in which it obtained precisely the result it wanted. That kind of sweeping
victory may tempt executive officials to enforce but not defend laws with far
greater frequency.
The temptation will be powerful considering the increasing scrutiny of executive
litigation decisions by political activists, new media, and interest groups. As the
Obama administration vividly learned during its initial defense of DOMA,

147. The Court’s eagerness in Windsor to move constitutional cases up the appellate
ladder may seem to be in tension with its common practice, in evaluating petitions for
certiorari, to allow issues to “percolate” in the lower courts. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S.
1, 23–24 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that “periods of ‘percolation’” when
new legal problems arise “may yield a better informed and more enduring final
pronouncement by this Court”); John Paul Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66
JUDICATURE 177, 183 (1982) (“[E]xperience with conflicting interpretations of federal rules
may help to illuminate an issue before it is finally resolved and thus may play a constructive
role in the lawmaking process.”). But historically the Court has not followed that practice in
cases where a lower court strikes down a federal or state law as unconstitutional. As recently
as 1988, Congress made “percolation” impossible by assigning the Supreme Court
mandatory appellate jurisdiction in such cases, and the Court still considers them some of the
strongest candidates for certiorari. GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 34, § 4.12, at 264 (“Where
the decision below holds a federal statute unconstitutional . . . certiorari is usually granted
because of the obvious importance of the case.”).
148. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (collecting scholarship arguing that, by
enforcing but not defending federal law, the Executive violates the Constitution).
149. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013).
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defending a controversial law may carry substantial political costs.150 Abandoning
defense of a law, on the other hand, allows the Executive to deflect that criticism
and use the courts as political cover. The President can please constituents and
interest groups who dislike a law by publicly condemning it as unconstitutional. At
the same time, he can assure supporters of the law that the courts ultimately will
decide the issue, shifting blame to the judiciary. In concept, electing to enforce but
not defend a law is an act of humility and respect for other branches. In practice,
however, the decision may be tainted by more crass political calculations. Many
federal laws infuriate partisans on one side or the other—on affirmative action,
partial-birth abortion, campaign finance, gun control, school choice, etc.—and
future Presidents may see the non-defense option as a way out of a political jam.
The marriage cases will make that option more tempting.
For several reasons, that development would be damaging. First, regular nondefense by the Executive would threaten the stability of federal law. As Daniel
Meltzer has argued, it would be undesirable to create a “regime in which each
administration views itself as having significant latitude to refuse to enforce and
defend acts of Congress.”151 Frequent vacillation by the Executive in litigation—
spurred by a new President’s different views about constitutional law or the
appropriate circumstances for non-enforcement and non-defense—would
destabilize federal law and threaten the interests of private parties who act in
reliance on existing constitutional judgments.
Second, frequent decisions not to defend could undermine the Executive’s
credibility in litigation, to the detriment of all three branches. Today, attorneys for
the Executive Branch enjoy institutional advantages that make them exceptionally
effective adversaries. They are repeat players who can cultivate a strong reputation
and familiarity with the courts,152 they have ready access to expert regulatory
agencies, and they are often career government attorneys with years of valuable
experience.153 As a result, the Office of the Solicitor General is widely regarded as

150. See Josh Gerstein, DOMA Move Helps President Obama with Gays, POLITICO (Mar.
1, 2011, 4:20 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/50388.html (noting that the
decision not to defend DOMA “has dramatically warmed [President Obama’s] relationship
with gay and lesbian activists—clearing the way for the president and Democrats to
fundraise aggressively in the gay community” following two years in which “[s]ome gay
Democratic donors organized boycotts,” while “[o]thers picketed fundraisers Obama
headlined, and even heckled him at public events”).
151. Meltzer, supra note 123, at 1228 (emphasis omitted); id. at 1228–30 (predicting that
different administrations will have “sharply different views” about the proper occasions for
non-enforcement and about constitutional law).
152. REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 31 (1992)
(calling the Solicitor General “the definitive Repeat Player[]”); Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy
Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the
Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1493 (2008). But see Kevin T. McGuire, Explaining Executive
Success in the U.S. Supreme Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 505, 506–07, 522–23 (1998)
(challenging conventional wisdom by finding that the Executive Branch succeeds in the
Supreme Court because of its litigation experience, rather than other qualities).
153. See Thomas W. Merrill, High-Level, “Tenured” Lawyers, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 83, 83–87 (1998).
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“the best advocate there is” before the U.S. Supreme Court,154 and lawyers for the
Department of Justice generally enjoy a strong reputation in the lower courts.155
Non-defense and flip-flopping by the Executive, however, could forfeit some of
those institutional advantages as courts become skeptical of executive officials’
motives. It could also leave Congress without a vigorous defense, since counsel for
intervenors or amicus curiae often lack the Executive’s institutional advantages.156
And the courts, which depend on the quality and integrity of the adversarial
process, would be harmed by a gap in the quality of advocacy in constitutional
cases.157
Third, frequent non-defense of federal laws may afford the Executive with
troubling new opportunities for strategic litigation behavior. The Court in Windsor
sought to clear away standing obstacles on appeal to protect “the Supreme Court’s
primary role in determining the constitutionality of [the] law.”158 But nothing in
Windsor requires executive officials to seek immediate review from the Supreme
Court upon “prevailing” in a district court. Executive officials are also free, for
example, to engage in strategic delays (e.g., “the Court isn’t ready yet, so let’s wait
until next Term, or for a change in personnel”), the cherry-picking of forums (e.g.,
“the Fifth Circuit might reverse and uphold the law, so let’s appeal only in the
Ninth Circuit”), or the selection of a favorable vehicle (e.g., “let’s hold off for a
more appealing plaintiff”). Counsel for BLAG accused the Executive of engaging
in some of those tactics in the DOMA litigation,159 and the accusation should not
come as a surprise. The Office of the Solicitor General already considers those
factors in weighing possible appeals and petitions for certiorari to defend a law

154. Richard J. Lazarus, The Power of Persuasion Before and Within the Supreme Court:
Reflections on NEPA’s Zero for Seventeen Record at the High Court, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV.
213, 243; see Timothy R. Johnson, James F. Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Oral Advocacy
Before the United States Supreme Court: Does It Affect the Justices’ Decisions?, 85 WASH.
U. L. REV. 457, 469 (2007) (“[I]t is generally agreed that the nation’s best appellate
advocates often work for this office and become among the most experienced attorneys to
appear before the Court.”).
155. Frost, supra note 125, at 917. I served as a Bristow Fellow in the Solicitor General’s
office in 2006–2007, and I certainly share that assessment based on my experience there and
my subsequent practice as a member of the Supreme Court bar.
156. Sometimes intervenors and amici can retain top-flight counsel to defend an act of
Congress, as BLAG did by hiring former Solicitor General Paul Clement to appear before
the Supreme Court in Windsor. But that kind of coup is not always possible, especially at the
trial-court level where, as Clement observed at oral argument, counsel has the crucial
responsibility of developing a record. Windsor Arg. Tr., supra note 7, at 40 (argument of
Paul Clement) (arguing that “party status is critical” because “[o]nly a party can take a
deposition”).
157. Cf. Meltzer, supra note 123, at 1211 (arguing that a brief on behalf of Congress
“might not fully register with the courts” when the Department of Justice and the plaintiffs
both contend is unconstitutional).
158. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2688 (2013).
159. See Windsor Arg. Tr., supra note 7, at 50 (argument of Paul Clement) (“[W]e saw in
this case certain appeals were expedited, certain appeals weren’t. They did not serve the
interest of defending the statute, they served the distinct interest of the Executive.”).
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from constitutional attack,160 and sophisticated public interest litigators make
similar calculations.
Dicta in Windsor appear to heighten the risk of strategic litigation behavior by
suggesting that the Executive enjoys an unprecedented degree of control over the
appellate docket when it elects to enforce but not defend. Although the Court held
that the judgment against the United States satisfied Article III, the Court insisted
that “[i]t would be a different case if the Executive had taken the further step of
paying Windsor the refund.”161 The implication is that, if the judgment had been
paid, neither the United States nor the private-party plaintiff would have standing to
appeal. That dictum suggests that the Executive could short-circuit any appeal, and
thereby exert complete control over appeals from district court “victories,” simply
by satisfying the judgment and paying off the private-party plaintiff whose claim it
supported but wished to delay for strategic reasons. Coupled with the Executive’s
ability to settle claims and thereby discourage a private-party appeal whenever the
United States suffers a “defeat” in the district court, the Executive could enjoy a
near monopoly on the profile of cases that reaches the appellate level when it elects
to enforce but not defend.162 That would be a marked contrast to the Executive’s
strategic options in other settings, which are constrained by criminal defendants,
regulated businesses, interest groups, and other private parties who may choose to
appeal in a case the Executive considers strategically suboptimal. If, as Windsor
suggests, the Executive would enjoy an unusual degree of control over the appellate
docket whenever it elects not to defend federal law, there is every reason to believe
it will use that power strategically.163 No doubt Justice Scalia was alluding to that
risk in dissent when he urged that an Article III bar was necessary as “insulation
from Executive contrivance.”164

160. Barbara D. Underwood, Facts on the Ground and Federalism in the Air: The
Solicitor General’s Effort to Defend Federal Statutes During the Federalism Revival,
21 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 473, 474–76 (2007); see also Lazarus, supra note 154, at
244.
161. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686.
162. In theory, Congress or some group of legislators could intervene and attempt to
appeal as well. But it is not at all clear after Windsor that Congress would have standing to
do so, and even assuming standing is proper, Congress’s participation faces various practical
hurdles and “depend[s] upon the political vicissitudes of the moment.” Meltzer, supra note
123, at 1211–13 (arguing that “congressional pinch-hitting will often not be a full substitute
for defense by the executive”).
163. My previous research has discussed other contexts in which the President and
Congress seek indirectly to influence the behavior of the Supreme Court and individual
Justices. See David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?,
92 CORNELL L. REV. 453 (2007) (senior status); David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Navigating
the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1869 (2008) (appointment
and confirmation of Supreme Court Justices); David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining
Life Tenure: The Case for a “Golden Parachute,” 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1397 (2005) (pensions
and other retirement incentives). A monopoly over appeals would give the Executive a much
more direct form control over the Court’s docket.
164. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2702 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see id. at 2700 (arguing that the
government’s appeal was a “contrivance” designed solely to secure nationwide precedent).
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Alert to those risks, the Court in Windsor insisted in dictum that it did not mean
to endorse Executive non-defense of laws as a “routine exercise.”165 But the
Court’s reasoning on the standing issues may speak louder than its notes of caution.
Although concerned about extending the non-defense practice to ordinary cases, the
Court deemed those concerns outweighed by two factors that made this case “not
routine”: the participation of amicus curiae to defend the statute, and the need for
swift and uniform resolution of the issue to avoid years of litigation, confusion, and
continuing injury.166 Yet those factors are hardly extraordinary in litigation
challenging the constitutionality of a federal statute. Virtually any law popular
enough to win approval by Congress enjoys enough support that some amicus will
be willing to file a brief in its defense.167 And because federal law is binding in all
U.S. district courts and circuits, challenges to federal law regularly raise concerns
about disuniformity, prolonged litigation, and a lack of clear guidance. Indeed,
safeguarding the uniformity of federal law is so central to the role of the Supreme
Court that some scholars maintain the withdrawal of the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction would unconstitutionally interfere with its “essential functions.”168 As a
consequence, the Court may have difficulty following through on its promise to
restrict appellate jurisdiction if Executive non-defense becomes routine.
CONCLUSION
As a referendum on same-sex marriage, Perry and Windsor may have
disappointed activists on both sides with a middle-ground holding. As Article III
standing decisions, however, the marriage cases were blockbusters. Both decisions
significantly reshaped the law of standing on appeal, breaking new ground and in
some instances breaking sharply with past precedent. Yet there is reason for
cautious optimism about the consequences of the decisions for the separation of
powers. By endorsing and strengthening the executive power to enforce but not
defend federal laws, the Court preserved an option that promises to reduce
interbranch conflict. The major risk is that executive officials will be powerfully

165. Id. at 2689 (majority opinion) (“The integrity of the political process would be at
risk if difficult constitutional issues were simply referred to the Court as a routine
exercise.”); see id. at 2688 (stressing that the holding “does not imply that no difficulties
would ensue if this were a common practice in ordinary cases”); id. at 2689 (disavowing any
suggestion “that it is appropriate for the Executive as a matter of course to challenge statutes
in the judicial forum rather than making the case to Congress for their amendment or
repeal”).
166. Id. at 2687–89.
167. In Windsor alone, the Court received briefs from thirty-one amici defending
section 3 of DOMA on the merits.
168. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362,
1364–65 (1953) (articulating the argument that the Supreme Court must retain enough
appellate jurisdiction to perform its “essential role . . . in the constitutional plan”); Leonard
G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme
Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929, 935 (1982) (arguing that, in light of the Supremacy
Clause, the Supreme Court’s “essential functions” are the enforcement of uniformity and
supremacy).
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tempted to use that power as a matter of routine when called upon to enforce
politically controversial laws.
Given the unique and explosive context in which Windsor was decided, the
Court may soon retreat from some aspects of the decision. It retains some leverage
under the auspices of prudential standing to defend itself against aggressive
litigation tactics by executive officials. The Executive, too, may move cautiously in
the aftermath of the decision to avoid provoking appellate courts and to preserve its
options. The legacy of the marriage cases, over the long term, may have little to do
with marriage and much to do with the separation of powers.

